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I.

INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
This memorandum surveys the rights of defendants in regards to cross-examination in

cases from past and current war crimes trials, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and
in the national courts of countries around the world. Since the International Criminal Court
(ICC) should be a mixture of both civil law and common law procedures, this paper utilizes both
statutes and cases from both traditions.∗
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) allowed Milosevic
to cross-examine witnesses during his self-representation and he badgered his witnesses to the
point of harassment.1 The advisors to the shapers of the Iraqi High Tribunal’s statutes saw that
Saddam Hussein could similarly hi-jack his trial by disrupting the court.2 When the Iraqi
National Assembly adopted a statute saying all defendants before the Tribunal must have Iraqi

∗

“Should the International Criminal Court (ICC) allow self-represented defendants an absolute right to crossexamine witnesses? If so, how much leeway should the court allow the defendant to have? Should the ICC refrain
from impinging on the defendant’s right or limit the defendant’s ability during cross-examination? Should the ICC
allow a represented defendans to follow up his counsel’s cross-examination with more cross examination of his
own, as is allowed in the IHT and other civil law countries generally?”

1

Michael P. Scharf, “Self-Representation versus Assignment of Defence Counsel before
International Criminal Tribunals,” ICJ 4 1 (31), (1 March 2006), p. 36 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 53].

2

Michael P. Scharf, “Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in
War Crimes Trials.” 39 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 155, (2006-2007), p. 163. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 49].

8

Stephanie Unick
International War Crimes Research Lab
Fall 2007

Counsel,3 it seemed that the court would be able to ensure some order. However, the judges
decided to follow the Iraqi tradition of permitting a defendant to cross-examine each witness
after his lawyer had done so.4 In view of these past problem, this memorandum will discuss
what the ICC should do in respect to the cross-examination rights of defendants, and what the
court can do to avoid abuse of cross-examination.
B. Summary of Conclusions
i. Many courts have held that while their statutes may state the
defendant has the right to examine or have the witness examined
against him or her, this does not mean there is an automatic right for
the defendant to represent himself or examine witnesses on his own.
The statutes for the ICTY, International Criminal Trial for Rwanda (ICTR), International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and ICC all state that a defendant has the right
to examine, or have the witness examined. This statement does not mean that there is a
guarantee that the defendant can directly examine the witness, or that the defendant even needs
to be in the room while the witness is being examined. In fact, the statement, “the defendant has
the right to examine” could mean that the counsel has the right to examine the witnesses, in
instances where the defendant has representation.
ii. A court that does allow self-representation also often requires standby
counsel to step in and represent the client when he or she becomes too
disruptive. This may be too late, however, as disruption of the court
room has already occurred and the integrity of the trial may have
been damaged.
3

Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, Art. 19(d), Oct. 18, 2005, available at www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab X].
4

Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments [Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code] para. 168(A), Nov. 23, 1971,
available at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi_Criminal_Procedure_Code.pdf, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
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Cases from the Iraqi High Tribunal, and the United States Supreme Court show that the
appointment and the stepping in of standby counsel is not a violation of a defendant’s right to
self-representation. Standby counsel can fill the shoes of a self-represented defendant when he is
being too disruptive, or when he shows he cannot handle the complexities of the court. Standby
counsel can also fill in for regular defense counsel if they become disruptive.
iii. Some witnesses need protection from direct contact with the
defendant, but the rights of the accused must be weighed carefully
against those of the witnesses. The ICC must be careful not to
infringe upon the rights of the accused.
Case law and statutes from various nations and statutes of the majority of war crimes
trials state that a defendant’s rights are paramount, but in an instance where a witness can be
protected without taking anything substantive away from the rights of the defendant, those
protections should be implemented.
iv. The right of a defendant to cross-examine a witness after a
defendant’s counsel has already done so was addressed in the
Nuremberg trial where the idea was rejected, even though local
German law allowed it. The Iraqi High Tribunal held to the
contrary, reasoning that since it was allowable in Iraqi law, it should
be allowed in the tribunal also. However, this tactic is often an outlet
for defendants represented by counsel to badger witnesses and
generally disrupt a courtroom.
Civil law statutes permit the defendant’s counsel, and the defendant himself, to crossexamine a witness. However, this right is qualified, because there are occasions where the
defendant is not in the courtroom, or cannot directly confront the witness due to protective
procedures. Some countries allow the defendant to ask questions of the witness through the
judge only, while others regulate the questions that can be asked.
v. There are alternatives to protect the witnesses and the rights of the
accused at the same time, such as video-link conferencing, testifying
behind a screen, or testimony while the defendant is out of the room.
10
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Witnesses may be reluctant to face the defendant out of fear of harassment, or fear of danger
for their safety or their families’ safety. When this fear stops the truth from being heard in the
courtroom, the court must take steps to ensure the witness feels protected and can testify in a safe
manner.
vi. War crimes tribunals are especially vulnerable to attack or criticism
since the whole world is watching them. Therefore, they must
maintain a sense of order and fairness.
When allowing a defendant to represent himself permits the defendant to act disruptively or
belligerently, the court must decide if taking away his right of self-representation is necessary.
This paper argues that this may be necessary because war crimes defendants are likely to behave
in such a manner since they know the world is watching them.
II.

Background
Robert Jackson famously said in the opening of the Nuremberg trial,
[We] must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today
is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a
poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well. We must summon such
detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this trial will commend itself
to posterity as fulfilling humanity’s aspirations to do justice.5

This lofty statement has roots in legal systems of the world, and war crimes trials to date
have attempted to follow it. M. Cherif Bassiouni compiled data from 139 national constitutions
around the world and found that roughly 30 guarantee an idea of “equality of arms.”6 This
5

Robert Jackson, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 2, Second Day, 21 November 1945, Morning Session, p. 100,
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/11-21-45.htm, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab7].
6

M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions,” 3 Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law, (Spring 1993) 235, 277. *Bassiouni notes that ‘equality of arms’ is
fundamental to the adversarial nature of modern criminal proceedings, and that the adversarial system is becoming
more and more widespread throughout the world, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
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“equality of arms” idea is the idea that courts protect the rights of defendants, to ensure justice
and fairness.7
However, some courts, in their attempt to assure justice to defendants, have allowed
defendants to disrupt the courts by harassing the judges and witnesses, and speaking at length off
the topic.8 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia faced this problem in
the Milosevic trial9 and attempted to correct it in later trials, such as Seselj.10 The Iraqi High
Tribunal sought to avoid the problem of defendants misbehaving, but was unable to do so, in part
because of a rule that allowed the defendants to cross-examine witnesses after their counsel had
already done so.11
One of the problems framers of war crimes tribunals face, is that they must look at laws
from all over the world and apply those which would fit best with each specific tribunal. While
common law, or adversarial, countries allow self-representation, civil law countries often allow
defendants to put forth questions to a witness after their counsel has already done so. Both selfrepresentation and follow-up cross-examination give defendants an opportunity to disrupt the
court by talking off topic and harassing witnesses.

7

Ibid.

8

Michael P. Scharf, “Self-Representation versus Assignment of Defence Counsel before International Criminal
Tribunals,” ICJ 4 1 (31), (1 March 2006), p. 36 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
9

Ibid.

10

Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to
Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defense, para. 21 (May 9, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].

11

Michael P. Scharf, “Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in
War Crimes Trials.” 39 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 155, (2006-2007), p. 163. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 49].

12

Stephanie Unick
International War Crimes Research Lab
Fall 2007

Fortunately, however, there are remedies to prevent these problems, starting with a
court’s discretion to stop and prevent disruptions from a defendant. A court should also take
measures to protect witnesses from defendants, and that often means a court does not allow a
defendant to directly face, or confront, a witness.
III.

INTRODUCTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF SELF-REPRESENTATION AND
CROSS-EXAMINATION
A. Problems with Former Heads of State
A court, especially an international war crimes tribunal with extra-powerful defendants

and vulnerable witnesses, must decide how to balance the rights of one, and the protection of the
other. The defendants often abuse the witnesses, and the witnesses in turn, feel threatened for
their lives. It is particularly hard to protect a witness when the defendant himself is the one
asking the questions. In the case of self-represented defendants, however, it seems as though the
defendants would have to be the person cross-examining the witnesses.
Slobodan Milosevic represented himself, and during cross-examination he would
“browbeat” the witnesses and “pontificate at length.”12 This gave Milosevic opportunities to
make statements that were not subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. These
disruptions also gave Milosevic opportunities to repeatedly question the legitimacy of the court
and encourage viewers of the trial (a significant number of Serbians) to believe that the trial was

12

Marc Champion, “Court of Opinion: With Hague Case, Defiant Milosevic Wins at Home; As Daily Coverage
Keeps Serbs Riveted to TV, Many Feel As if They're on Trial Too,” W'all St. J., Jan. 10, 2003, A-1, available at
2003 WL-WSJ 3956244As cited in Michael P. Scharf, “The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial” 37 New Eng. L. Rev.
915, Summer 2003, p. 919. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52].
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unfair.13 This was unfortunate, as several of the goals of a public war crimes trial are contingent
on how the victims and the guilty view it. An unfair trial or an illegitimate trial cannot bring:
national reconciliation; a halt to the final violence; forgiveness and reconciliation between
victims and those responsible for the atrocities; or, a new order for a government looking to
detach itself from its former regime.14
The Iraqi High Tribunal decided not to let Saddam Hussein represent himself, but did
allow him to cross-examine witnesses after his counsel had finished.15 The court allowed this
because of an Iraqi Criminal Procedure rule that allows a defendant to “discuss the testimony via
the court and ask questions and request clarifications to establish the facts.”16 Hussein often
timed his outbursts to coincide with “the most emotionally compelling testimony of victims.”17
And after his lawyers would finish cross-examination of a witness, Hussein would take
advantage of the Iraqi tradition to make political speeches and ask his followers to kill American
occupiers and Iraqi government collaborators.18 Similar to the Milosevic trial, the court televised
Saddam’s trial and his followers heard his speeches and statements. In the end, the disruptions
13

Michael P. Scharf and Christopher M. Rassi, “Do Former Leaders Have An International Right To SelfRepresentation In War Crimes Trials?” 20 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol 3, 2005, p.17. [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 50].

14

Id. p. 28.

15

Michael P. Scharf, “Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in
War Crimes Trials” 39 CASE W. RES J. INT’L L.155, 2006-2007, p.163. [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 49].

16

Ibid.

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid.
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from Saddam made his trial a mockery and many have regarded this as one of the “messiest trials
in legal history.”19
B. Witness Protection
Another problem with allowing a defendant to perform cross-examinations is witness
protection. “A witness’s involvement with the Tribunal should not amount to a second round of
victimization as the witness ‘runs the gauntlet’ of reliving a painful experience by testifying
before an indifferent bureaucracy, an assaultive defense team, or an unsympathetic media.”20
Truth-seeking is at the heart of a trial,21 and can be hampered when witnesses are afraid to testify
or are intimidated in the face of a defendant. Some restrictions placed on a defendant’s right to
confront his accuser, and the cross-examination rights, could help witnesses, and aid the truthseeking process.
IV.

STATUTES OF HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS AND COURTS REGARDING
CROSS-EXAMINATION AND SELF-REPRESENTATION

This paper will first examine statutory treatments of a defendant’s rights to crossexamination and self-representation, since permitting self-representation also means permitting a
defendant to personally cross-examine. Not allowing a self-represented defendant to crossexamine would infringe upon his right to self-representation, thus it is important to look at the
rights of self-representation. However, there are ways for the court to cut back on a defendant’s
freedoms in confronting a witness without infringing on his rights of a fair trial or due process.

19

Id. p.155.

20

Alex C. Lakatos, “Balancing Witnesses’ Needs against Defendants’ Rights,” 46 Hastings L.J. 909, 911 (Mar.
1999), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
21

Id. p.934.
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The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) allows the accused
“to conduct the defense in person or through legal assistance of the accused’s choosing…”22 It
also allows the accused “to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her….” 23
This statute was based on Article 14 of the ICCPR.24 Article Fourteen says, in wording almost
identical to Article 67 of the Rome Statute, every person charged with a crime has the right “to
examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him…”25 The ICC Statute also mirrors the
ICCPR when it says each defendant also has the right “to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing….”26 Please look at Appendix I on page 50, for a list of the
statutes of human rights documents and courts regarding cross-examination and selfrepresentation.27
To determine the ambiguities of the ICCPR, one could look to the intent of the framers of
it. The negotiating record of this treaty indicates that the drafters were concerned with effective
representation.28 Effective representation means competent representation, representation that

22

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 67(d), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter ICC
Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf,
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
23

Id. art. 67 (e).

24

Michael P. Scharf, “ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on Slobodan Milosevic’s Right to Self-Representation”
ASIL Insight, November 2004, ¶4 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51].

25

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(e), March 23, 1976, [hereinafter ICCPR], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

26

Id. art. 14(d).
The statutes of the treaties in Appendix I are, the International Court of Justice, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights (Banjul Charter), and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

27

28

Scharf, supra at note 17, ¶4.
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does all it can for the defendant, within the rules of the court. Effective representation does not
mean allowing a defendant to do as he wishes, or permitting him to disrupt the court.
Over 150 States that have signed the ICCPR Statute, and many of them helped to write
the various statutes. A vast majority of the States that signed the ICCPR have also helped to
formulate other treaties with similar wording.29
A. The European Court of Human Rights
As noted above, many of these documents have similar provisions, and, many of these
provisions are echoed below in the statutes of war crimes tribunals. The European Court of
Human Rights makes decisions based on the European Convention on Human Rights. It has
made many decisions on the defendant’s right to confront, and his right to direct the case the way
he chooses,30 and wisdom can be gained from its decisions.
In respect to the issue of self-representation, the ECHR has decided many notable cases,
the most relevant to this issue is Hill v. Spain, 1997. In this case, when a defendant asks for the
right to act on his own behalf, that is allowed if it is shown he is “competent and understands the
consequences.”31 The court here is saying that, since a defendant has a right to represent
himself, and a right to cross-examine (see below for discussion of holdings by the ECHR that
state this), he has the right to cross-examine on his own.

29

Forty-five European countries ratified the ECHR; 150 countries signed the ICCPR; the ACHR has 25 parties to
the Convention,; the Banjul Charter has 53 parties in Africa; and, the ICC Rome Statute has 97 parties.

30

Michael and Brian Hill v. Spain, Communication No. 526/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/526/1993 (2 April
1997) (hereinafter called Hill v. Spain), available at www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/526-1993.html
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab13].

31

Id. at para. 14.2.
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In Kostovski v. the Netherlands, 1989, the ECHR said that the inability of the defendant
to question witnesses violates the European Convention on Human Rights.32 In this case, in
order to insure witness protection, the witnesses were interviewed by police officers, without the
defendant, his counsel, or even the magistrate, present. The court decided that a defendant could
not be convicted on evidence presented by a witness that neither he nor his counsel could
question.33 The Kostovski court did not, however, say that a defendant had a right to question a
witness personally if his counsel also had the right.34
To separate the Hill case from the Kostovski case, one could assume that a client could
act on his own behalf, including cross-examination of witnesses, but where the safety of the
witness requires it, a lawyer would need to be present to step in. The ECHR does not
specifically address the idea of a lawyer stepping in, but tribunals do sometimes appoint standby
counsel, who could cross-examine a witness that the court needs to protect from the defendant,
when needed. See discussion below, notes 104 through 118, and accompanying text.
In deciding Doorson v. the Netherlands (1996), the ECHR followed Kostovski. The court
declared, in Doorson, that when the magistrate knows the identity of the witnesses and the
defendant’s counsel may ask the witnesses any question, the defendant has sufficient justice,

32

Kostovski v. The Netherlands, Application no. 11454/85 (November 20, 1989) ¶49, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=kostovski&sessionid=34
05353&skin=hudoc-en [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15], Also cited in Stephen C. Thaman,
Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Casebook Approach, 2002 Carolina Academic Press, 132 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 58].
33

Ibid.

34

Ibid
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even if the defendant has not seen the witness and requested to do so.35 This ECHR is saying
here that not only does a defendant not have an absolute right to confront a witness personally,
but he does not even need to be in the room personally.
In Hendrik van Mechelen et al. v. The Netherlands (1997), the ECHR held that at least
defense counsel must be able to see the witnesses. In this situation, the only access the defendant
and his counsel had to the witnesses was through a sound link.36 This is not acceptable to protect
the defendant’s rights because the defense could not observe the witnesses’ demeanor under
direct questioning.37 Where, in Chassagnou (supra, note 33 and accompanying text ), the court
found that rights can be infringed upon under necessity, the Van Mechelen court found that there
must be a “proper substitute” to the compromise of the right.38 Seeing a witness through a sound
link put the defense under a handicap that was not properly counterbalanced.39 This case
follows Doorson in that it requires, at least, that counsel be able to cross-examine a witness, and
it does not require that a defendant must also be present.40

35

Doorson v. The Netherlands, Application no. 20524/92 (March 26, 1996) ¶68, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=doorson&sessionid=340
5500&skin=hudoc-en [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12]. Also cited in Stephen C. Thaman,
Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Casebook Approach, 2002 Carolina Academic Press, 132 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 58].
36

Van Mechelen, and Others v. The Netherlands, Application nos. 2163/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 and 22056/93
(January 23, 1997) ¶59, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].

37

Ibid.

38

Id ¶62

39

Ibid.

40

Doorson v. The Netherlands, Application no. 20524/92 (March 26, 1996) ¶68, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=doorson&sessionid=340
5500&skin=hudoc-en, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
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In J.J. v. The Netherlands (1998), the court also said that parties in a criminal trial have
the right to “have knowledge of and comment on all evidence,” including witnesses, and make
observations with a view of influencing the court. 41 J.J. does not give defendants the right to
confront witnesses in person, although it does require that defendants need to know of the
testimony of the witnesses and be given a chance to comment on it during the trial.
Chassagnou v. France (2000) set the standard that if there are “necessary” and
“proportionate” means of advancing the state’s objective, then it is acceptable to restrict a right
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.42 The court applied a balancing test
in Chassagnou, saying that an infringement of a right can occur only under certain
circumstances. One of these circumstances is when there is “a ‘pressing social need’ capable of
justifying interference with one of the rights guaranteed by the Convention.”43 As noted in the
chart above, the European Convention on Human Rights provides for the right of a defendant to
cross-examine.
As the ECHR cases above show, the court usually does protect the right of a defendant to
cross-examine a witness, but this is a qualified right. As Chassagnou points out, this right is

41

J.J. v. The Netherlands, (9/1997/793/994) 27 March 1998 (ECHR) ¶43, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab14].

42

Chassagnou v. France, 29 E.H.R.R. 615 (2000) (ECHR) ¶112, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=chassagnou%20%7C%2
0v.%20%7C%20france&sessionid=3405500&skin=hudoc-en, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab11].
43

Id. ¶113.
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subject to the needs of society.44 When there is a need to protect witnesses, the defendant need
not be present, although his counsel must be.45

V.

WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS’ STATUTE PROVISIONS REGARDING CROSSEXAMINATION AND SELF-REPRESENTATION
The majority of the war crimes tribunal statutes have also followed the language of

Article 14 of the ICCPR on the issues of cross-examination and self-representation. The
International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and in the Far East were written before the
ICCPR, and even these statutes, however, are remarkably similar. Refer to Appendix II for a
complete listing of the statutes of war crimes tribunals46 and both International Military
Tribunals regarding self-representation and cross-examination, on page 52.

A. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
Article 16 of the Nuremberg Charter states that a defendant has the right to conduct his
own defense before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of counsel.47 Also a defendant had the
right “through himself or through his counsel” to present evidence and to cross-examine any

44

Ibid.

45

Doorson v. The Netherlands, Application no. 20524/92 (March 26, 1996) ¶68, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=doorson&sessionid=340
5500&skin=hudoc-en, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
46

The war crimes tribunals listed in Appendix II are, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Iraqi High Tribunal, and the
Extraordinary Chambers for the Courts of Cambodia.

47

Statute of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Art. 16(d), 1945 [hereinafter Nuremberg
Charter], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm#art16, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
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witness from the prosecution.48 The tribunal in Nuremberg even explicitly ruled on Article
16(e), and decided that when a defendant has counsel he has no right to cross-examine witnesses
himself. Justice Robert Jackson, the prosecutor at Nuremberg, said in his opinion, that a
defendant has a right to counsel, or to defend himself. If he defends himself, he has the right of
all the “privileges of counsel,” if he has counsel however, allowing him to cross-examine in
conjunction with his counsel “would become a performance rather than a trial.”49 The court
itself justified this position by saying a defendant has the right to be called as a witness himself
and to make a statement of his own.50
B. The International Military Tribunal of the Far East
Article 9 of the IMTFE statute allows a defendant to be self-represented, but will appoint
counsel if it feels “such appointment is necessary to provide for a fair trial.”51 A defendant also
has a right to examine any witnesses through his counsel or to do it himself.52 This statute
clearly states that a defendant cannot cross-examine after his counsel does, but may do so if he is
self-represented.
C. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

48

Nuremberg Charter, supra note 55, art. 16(e), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab37].

49

Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 3,1 Dec 1945, p. 31, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/12-01-45.htm, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab7].

50

Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 3, supra note 49, p. 33.

51

Statute of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 9(c), 1946 [hereinafter Far East
Charter], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab38].
52

Id. at Article 9(d).
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The ICTY was the first war crimes tribunal after the World War II period and, in a sense,
has been paving the way for the tribunals following it. The ICTY was often criticized for
allowing Milosevic to represent himself, or give the impression that he was representing
himself.53 In Prosecutor v. Milosevic, the court said that allowing a defendant to represent
himself is a “necessary evil” to ensure justice is met.54
Later the court decided that poor health can eventually be a reason to no longer allow a
defendant’s personal appearance at trial.55 This conclusion was reached when Milosevic’s
deteriorating health postponed the trial several times, and at one point for several months.56 The
court did determine that a defendant must have representation imposed upon him if there is a
health reason the defendant can no longer defend himself. The court did not state that
representation must be imposed for the sake of cross-examination, and in fact allowed Milosevic
to abuse the times he was cross-examining witnesses.57

53

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54 30 August 2001, at 18 ('Status Conference'). As cited
in Michael P. Scharf, “Self-Representation versus Assignment of Defence Counsel before
International Criminal Tribunals,” ICJ 4 1 (31) (2006), 31, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab3].

54

Ibid.

55

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Camber’s Decision on the Assignment of
Defense Counsel ¶20, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, 1 November 2004, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab3].

56

Michael P. Scharf, “ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on Slobodan Milosevic’s Right to Self-Representation”
ASIL Insight, November 2004, ¶2, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab X].
57
Michael P. Scharf, “Self-Representation versus Assignment of Defence Counsel before International Criminal
Tribunals,” ICJ 4 1 (31), § 3(A) (1 March 2006), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
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However, in other cases decided in the ICTY, the court has restricted defendants’ rights
to represent themselves.58 In Krajisnic, the court took away the defendant’s right to selfrepresentation but let him add to his counsel’s cross with his own questions.59 The court did say
however that this decision was, “an exception to the usual regime…”60The court allowed
Krajisnic to do this as a very special exception, to a defendant’s persistent demands for selfrepresentation and the court saw that allowing it would not disrupt the trial.61 Thus, if a
defendant immediately qualifies for self-representation, as did Milosevic, and has the right taken
away from him due to illness, or is granted an exceptional right based on the rare discretion of
the court, he could qualify for cross-examining after his counsel does, per the ICTY.
If the court did allow a defendant to cross-examine, it set up guidelines regarding what to
do if the defendant abused his chances to speak. In Seselj the Appeals Chamber agreed with a
decision made by the Trial Chamber to revoke Seselj’s right to self-representation where there
are appropriate circumstances “rising to the level of substantial and persistent obstructing [of] the
proper and expeditious conduct of the trial.”62 The Chamber in Seselj put the rights of the
defendant in perspective. They held that a fair trial means fairness for more than just the
defendant. The court must make sure that the rights of the defendant are balanced with the

58

Prosecutor v. Seselj, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj
with his Defence, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, 9 May 2003, “F. Disposition,” [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 4].

59

Prosecutor v. Krajisnic, Reasons for Oral Decision Denying Mr. Krajisnic’s Request to Proceed Unrepresented by
Counsel, Case No. IT-00-39-T, 18 August 2005, para. 3. [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

60
61

Id.
Id.

62

Prosecutor v. Seselj, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Counsel, Case
No. IT-03-67-AR73.3, 8 December 2006, at para. 21, [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
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overall theme of justice which requires “that the trial proceeds in a timely manner without
interruptions, adjournments or distractions.”63
A defendant’s rights to cross-examine may be limited because he is too disruptive, or also
in the interest of protecting a witness. In Tadic, the ICTY found that protective measures are
necessary to assure witnesses that neither they, nor their families would be in danger if they
testified. This included limiting the right of the accused to examine, or even to have examined,
witnesses against him. While this should be done only in exceptional circumstances, “situations
of armed conflict where atrocities allegedly were committed qualify as an ‘exceptional
circumstance par excellence.’”64 The court continued by saying, “It is for this kind of situation
that most major international human rights instruments allow some derogation from recognized
procedural guarantees.”65
The Tadic court allowed some witnesses to be anonymous, but placed restrictions on the
questioning of these witnesses. It also required an investigation into the reliability of the
witnesses to be transmitted to the Chamber. The Chamber reserved the right to exclude evidence
given by anonymous witnesses if the value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by its
unfairness to the defendant.66

63

Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to
Assist Vojislav Seselj with His Defense, para. 21 (May 9, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].

64

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and
Witnesses, 10 August 1995, ¶61. As cited in Mercedeh Momeni, “Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused
against a Mandate to Protect Victims and Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rules of the Trial,” 41
How. L.J. 155, p. 166 (Fall 1997). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].

65

Ibid.

66

Id. ¶63.
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Video-link conferencing was allowed as well in Tadic, and also in Delalic, et al. The
court recognized that having a witness out of the room infringed on the rights of the accused, but
“there are exceptions to the general rule where the right of the accused under Article 21(4)(e)
[the right of the accused to cross-examine of have cross-examined all witnesses] is not
prejudicially affected.”67 It decided the defendant would not be “prejudicially affected” in the
case of video-link conferencing because the judge would still be able to observe the demeanor of
the witness, and counsel could still cross-examine over the video, and the judge could put
questions to the witness.68 The court found that the presence of those two things: the judge being
able to determine the witness’s demeanor, and the right of counsel to cross-examine; constituted
justice. The court decided this out of necessity to keep the defendant from directly confronting a
witness, thus stating that the defendant has no absolute right to cross-examine in person.
Overall, regarding a defendant’s right to cross-examine in person after his counsel, that is
allowed in extremely limited circumstances. Those circumstances are explained in the Krajisnic
test where the cross-examination does not disrupt the trial,69 and in the Milosevic case where
self-representation had to be limited due to illness.70 In situations where witnesses need to be
protected, the court decided that it is sufficient for a defendant’s counsel to question the witness,
and the defendant has no personal access to the witness. When a defendant is self-represented,

67

Prosecutor v. Delalic and others, Decision on the Motion to Allow Witnesses K, L and M to Give their Testimony
by Means of Video-Link Conference, IT-96-21-T, 28 May 1997, ¶14, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab1].

68

Id ¶15.
Prosecutor v. Krajisnic, Reasons for Oral Decision Denying Mr. Krajisnic’s Request to Proceed Unrepresented by
Counsel, Case No. IT-00-39-T, 18 August 2005, para. 3. [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

69

70

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Camber’s Decision on the Assignment of
Defense Counsel ¶20, IT-02-54-AR73.7, 1 November 2004, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab3].
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the ICTY said that the defendant has the right to facilitate all functions as counsel, unless the
defendant’s actions make it imprudent to allow him to continue to represent himself.

D. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The ICTR, in its Barayagwiza decision found that defense counsel could be assigned over
the objection of the accused. The court found this was acceptable, and indeed preferable in this
situation, where assigned counsel could represent the interest of the Tribunal to ensure that the
Accused receives a fair trial.71 The court made this decision because the defendant refused to
attend the trial and felt having legal counsel contradicted his boycott of the trial. The court found
that Barayagwiza’s attempt to force his counsel to withdraw was more an attempt to obstruct the
justice of the trial, than a genuine complaint against his counsel.72
The attempt of Barayagwiza to dismiss his counsel indicates that the court was ready to
do everything possible to continue the case in an efficient manner. The law of the ICTR states
that a defendant has a right to “defend himself in person, or through legal assistance of his own
choosing….and to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interest of
justice so require.”73 Here, the court chose to apply the latter half of the article and assigned
counsel to Barayagwiza, to continue the trial in an efficient manner.74

71

Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw, ¶20, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, 2
November 2000, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/021100.htm, [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].

72

Id. ¶24.

73

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 20(4)(d), 8 November 1994 [hereinafter ICTR
Statute], available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html, [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 40].
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Article Twenty § 4(e) of the ICTR Statute says a defendant has the right “to examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him or her.”75 Applying the Barayagwiza precedent to a
defendant that wants to personally cross-examine after his own counsel, or even during his selfrepresentation, the court does not need to allow it if it is apparent the defendant wants to do this
to obstruct justice. The court has full discretion in this statute, and utilizes Barayagwiza, to
allow someone else to examine the prosecution’s witnesses.

E. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
In Prosecutor v. Norman, the Special Court for Sierra Leone found similarly to the ICTR
court in Barayagwiza, but for other reasons. Defendant Norman asked to represent himself after
the opening remarks of the prosecutor.76 The court declared that this would have been a more
feasible option if the defendant had asked for this at the beginning of the trial, and if other codefendants were not being tried with him. Instead, the defendant asked for the right to selfrepresentation after the trial had begun and the court found it in its best interest to disallow selfrepresentation to ensure an efficient trial.77
The court gave several specific reasons why allowing Norman to represent himself at this
juncture and in this particular situation would be detrimental to the court. Reason (iv) stated

74

Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, supra note 76, ¶21.

75

ICTR Statute, supra note 78, art. 20(4)(e).

76

Prosecutor v. Norman, et al., Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation under
Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court ¶5, SCSL-04-14-T, 8 June 2004, [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 9].

77

Id. ¶ 26.
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“[t]here is also the public interest, national and international, in the expeditious completion of the
trial.”78 Reason (v) continued with, “[f]urthermore, there is the high potential for disruption to
the Court’s timetable and calendar.”79 The SCSL is clearly concerned with an expeditious trial,
and one without disruption, both things that can be jeopardized when a defendant is allowed to
cross-examine personally.80
The court also justified itself by defining the role of defense counsel: to serve, not only
the interests of a defendant, but also the interest of the Court and the interests of justice.81 The
right of a defendant to cross-examine is also meant to serve the interests of the defendant, but of
the Court, and of justice.
The court, in this same opinion, also stated that it has the right to ensure the proceedings
of the trial are not tarnished, and conform with the “norms of the judicial process.”82 This is why
the court decided it could interpret the defendant’s right to representation, and this is why it has
the right to interpret the defendant’s right to cross-examine. The court cannot take away these
rights, but can see they are administered in an orderly fashion.

F. The Iraqi High Tribunal

78

Ibid.

79

Ibid.

80

Michael P. Scharf, “Self-Representation versus Assignment of Defence Counsel before International Criminal
Tribunals,” ICJ 4 1 (31), § 3(A) (1 March 2006), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53].

81

Prosecutor v. Norman, et al., Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation under
Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court ¶23, SCSL-04-14-T, 8 June 2004, [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 9].

82

Id ¶ 28.
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On August 11, 2005, the Iraqi National Assembly adopted the Statute of the Iraqi High
Tribunal. The Statute did not allow for self-representation, but instead stated that all defendants
before the Tribunal must have Iraqi Counsel, who could be assisted by foreign lawyers.83 While
this clause took away a defendant’s right to self-representation, it did not stop defendants from
being able to cross-examine witnesses after their counsel had already done so. The court decided
to use a procedure provided in the Iraqi criminal law allowing the defendant to ask questions of
the witness.84
The Statute stated specifically that, “[t]he accused may not directly question any witness
except through the Trial Chamber.85 This clearly indicates that the Tribunal fully expected the
defendant to directly confront a witness, and Saddam Hussein took full advantage of this right. 86
He used these moments as opportunities to disparage the courts and communicate with the
people watching the televised broadcast. The court needed to take control of a proceeding that
was viewed by many, human rights groups included, as unfair.87

83

Al-Waqa’I Al-Iraqiya, Iraqi High Criminal Court Law art. 19(4)(B), 18 October 2005, available at
http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
84
Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments ¶168(B), 14 February 1971, available at
http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/documents/Iraqi_Criminal_Procedure_Code.pdf, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
85

Al-Waqa’I Al-Iraqiya, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Rule 57, 18 October 2005,
available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_rules_procedure_evidence.pdf, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
86

Michael P. Scharf, “Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in
War Crimes Trials.” 39 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 155, (2006-2007), p. 163. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 49].

87

Id. at 167.
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The Iraqi procedural code, the original code that permits a defendant to cross-examine a
witness after his counsel has already done so, which the IHT used to form its statutes also states
in paragraph 154:
The court may prevent the parties and their representatives [from] speaking at undue
length or speaking outside the subject of the case, repeating statements, violating
guidelines or making accusations against another party or a person outside the case who
is unable to put forward a defense.88

The official procedure rules for the IHT do not go to such detail regarding acts the court may
prevent, but they do provide that the “Trial Chamber may exclude any person from the
proceedings… to maintain the dignity and decorum of the proceedings.”89 This rule applies to
the defendant but the court “[m]ay not order an accused to be removed from the court [] during
proceedings unless he acted [] disruptively.”90 The rules themselves seem to anticipate
misbehavior by the defendant, and give the court a remedy for disruptive defendants.
Misbehavior by a defendant can safely be defined as “speaking at undue length or speaking
outside the subject of the case, repeating statements, violating guidelines, or making accusations
against another party…outside the case…”91
In applying the rules to the Hussein trial, however, the court became a spectacle of abuse
and the exact things described in the Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings (i.e. parties speaking at
88

Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments, supra note 84, ¶154.

89

Al-Waqa’I Al-Iraqiya, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Rule 52, 18 October 2005,
available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/documents/IST_rules_procedure_evidence.pdf, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 28].

90

Ibid.

91

Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments, supra note 84, ¶154.
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undue length or outside the subject of the case) occurred.92 The court tried in many failed
attempts to control Hussein and his lawyers.93
These problems would have been avoided if the tribunal had adopted paragraph 154,
above. The court itself had a chance to control the proceedings under article 52 in the Iraqi
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The court tried to do this by removing Hussein and his
counsel at necessary intervals,94 but by then the damage had been done.95
The lesson to be learned from the Iraqi High Tribunal is to preemptively plan for a
disruptive defendant, and to enact rules that disallow a defendant’s rights to speak in court, as
they are likely to disrupt the court’s proceedings.

VI.

STATUTES AND CASE LAW OF CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW
COUNTRIES
M. Cherif Bassiouni looked at procedural protections in 139 national constitutions around

the world and found that only 33 specifically guarantee a right to confrontation, and most do so
only in general terms.96 Of these constitutions, 27 placed the right of confrontation or
examination among a cluster of rights that mention “equality of arms.” “Equality of arms” labels
the idea that the prosecution and defense should have equal tools at their disposal. “Equality of
arms” can be interpreted as containing an independent guarantee of defense cross-examination
92

Christopher Allbritton, Saddam’s Trial: Behind the Scene, TIME, Feb. 13, 2006, at 50–51 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TabX], as cited in Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom, 155 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 45].
93
Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom, 155.
94

Ibid.

96

Lakatos, 46 Hastings L.J. 909 at 930. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
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when the prosecution is permitted to directly examine a witness.97 Equality of arms is becoming
more and more important in the world as an ideal of justice.98
The “equality of arms” that exists in the 27 constitutions of Bassiouni’s study,
exists to ensure that the scales of justice do not tip too much against the defense.99 For
defendants, this means that they have the right to access of all witnesses, and the right to
confront. However, these “equality of arms” ideas do not mean a defendant’s guaranteed right to
confront a witness in person, or to cross-examine after the defendant’s counsel already has done
so.100
Self-representation is guaranteed by the ICCPR101, and the American Charter for Human
Rights says there is “the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by
legal counsel.”102 These words state a defendant can represent himself, but in no way say that
right is absolute, or that a court cannot alter it to protect other interests of justice, like witness
protection, or efficiency of a trial.103 The Banjul Charter guarantees the defendant the right to

97

Lakatos, 46 Hastings L.J. 909, 930-931, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47].

98

M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions,” 3 Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law, (Spring 1993) 235, 277, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 46].

99

Ibid.
Bassiouni’s study here says “in the due process system the scales of relatively equal procedural
opportunities tip too much against the defense, then the right of equality of arms
can be invoked to redress such an imbalance.” Id. at 278.

100

101

Statute of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(d), 1966, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

102

Statute of the American Convention on Human Rights art. 8(2)(d), 22 November 1969, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm, [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 35].
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have defense, “including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice.”104 This is an explicit
guarantee to self-representation.
Thirty-three of the constitutions in Bassiouni’s study also guarantee the right to selfrepresentation.105 Sixty-five more countries have language in their constitutions that talk about
the right to defense that could be construed to allow self-representation.106 However, in these
constitutions (and even the 33 that do guarantee the right), the courts in each of these countries
still maintain a right to ensure that the counsel is effective and adequate.107 These countries
believe that since the right to representation is so crucial, due process and the “integrity of the
judicial process” is also important.108 Thus, the courts hold the right to determine when a
defendant’s questioning is a right, or when the questioning impedes justice.109
A. Common Law Countries
Common law countries typically allow defendants a right to self-representation,110 but not
the right to follow-up counsel with questions or comments of their own.111
i. The United States

104

Statute of the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 7(1)(c), 27 June 1981, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
105

M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions,” 3 Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law, (Spring 1993) 235, 283, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 46].
106
107

Ibid.
Ibid.

108

Ibid.

109

Id. at 284.

110

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), 835, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab17].

111

United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, (S.D.N.Y. 1949), 372, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab19].
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In the United States, the right to self-representation is most clearly laid out in Faretta v.
California. In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court found that self-representation must be
granted when the defendant is competent, literate, and understands the consequences of his
actions.112 However, this right to self-representation does not extend to all circumstances.113
When a defendant acts irresponsibly or abuses his self-representation powers, he loses his rights
to represent himself.114
When it becomes clear that a defendant is using his self-representation right to disrupt
court proceedings, the right to act on his own behalf is not absolute.115 In fact, in Illinois v.
Allen, the United States Supreme Court found that a defendant who refuses to act responsibly can
be excluded from the courtroom during trial if his disruptive behavior threatens to make orderly
and proper proceedings “difficult or wholly impossible.”116 Thus, in the United States a
defendant who clearly wanted to abuse his right of self-representation in the court could be
dismissed.
The United States also has precedent on allowing a defendant to cross-examine after his
counsel does; it is not allowed because it is too disruptive to the flow of the court.117 In United

112

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].

113

Farhad v. United States, 190 F.3d 1097 (1999), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab18]

114

United States v. West, 877 F. 2d. 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1989), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24]

115

United States v. Harris, 317 F. Supp. 2d. 542, 544-545 (DNJ 2004)., [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 20]
116
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). The Court explained that it was “essential to the
proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmark of
all court proceedings in our country.” Id. at 343., [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab21].
117

United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab19]
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States v. Zacarias Moussaoui,118 the judge in a US district court told the defendant, Moussaoui,
as he was being thrown out of the courtroom, “you are the biggest enemy of yourself.”119 When
a court’s first interest is serving justice, sometimes a defendant obstructs justice to himself more
than anything else. This often happens when a defendant is being disruptive and abusive, and the
answer is often to restrict the rights of the defendant until he is no longer a threat to himself. The
Moussaoui court also said, that it has the discretion to deny a defendant’s motion to represent
himself if he is doing so to manipulate the judicial system.120
ii. The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom a defendant has a fundamental right to see his accusers, but that is
a limited right. 121 In R. v. Taylor, the court found there must be real grounds for fear or danger
for a witness to stay anonymous.122 In the UK, the defendant has a right to be present at the
examination of all witnesses, including the hearings which determine if the witness is
competent.123 However, a witness can be examined with a defendant out of the room if the
defendant’s behavior prevents the trial from a smooth operation.124 The United Kingdom also

118

United States v. Moussaoui, 537 U.S. 1101, (2003), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

119

Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom, p.160, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 49]

120

Moussaoui, p.1111, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

121

R. v. Taylor, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 253 (United Kingdom), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].

122

Ibid.

123

Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure, A Worldwide Study 182 (Carolina Academic Press, Durham North
Carolina, 2007), p.182, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 55].
124

Ibid.
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accepts the ECHR Kostovski case as applicable precedent125, which says that anonymous
testimony is not sufficient to convict a person, but that it can be used.126
iii. Australia
Australian case law also views cross-examination as a qualified right. The court in R. v.
Cremmen said that cross-examination by counsel may be terminated if it is beyond legitimate
bounds.127 Libke v. R limits the kinds of things that can be said during cross-examination, to
prevent abusing the witness and using the opportunity as a forum to espouse one’s personal
ideals. The court said questions to a witness should not include comments and personal views of
the cross-examiner, nor invite argument, nor can the answers be interrupted.128
B. Civil Law Countries
Civil law countries, on the other hand, do not recognize a right to self-representation, but
occasionally do allow defendants to follow up a cross-examination by their counsel with
questions of their own in some cases.129
i. France
In France, the accused can choose a lawyer to represent him, but if he does not choose
one the president of the court chooses one for him.130 During the trial it is necessary that a
125

Harper Jean Tobin, Memorandum for the Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Access to
Witnesses in National and International Criminal Cases, p.25, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 54].

126

Kostovski v. The Netherlands, November 20, 1989, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab15], as cited in
Stephen C. Thaman, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Casebook Approach 132 (Carolina Academic Press.
2002), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 58].
127

R. v. Cremmen, Ct. of Crim. Appeal, 27 June 1998 (Australia), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TabX],
as cited in Making it Easier for Complainants to Give Evidence, 4.120, n. 453 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at TabX]
128

Libke v. R. [2007] HCA 30 (Australia), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].

129

Prosecutor v. Saddam Hussein, Al-Dujail Lawsuit, Case no. 1/9 First/2005, available at
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab10].
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defendant be there, but his counsel must be there too, if counsel is not there, the court will
appoint counsel.131
Although counsel for the accused must be present, the accused, as well as his counsel, has
the right to ask questions of the witness.132 When the counsel questions the witness he may put
the questions directly to the witness, but when the accused asks questions, he must do so through
the president of the court.133 Also, the code explicitly states that the asking of questions to a
witness is subject to the discretion of the court and anything that might compromise the dignity
of the proceedings can be dismissed, “without expectation of any greater degree of certainty in
the outcome of the hearing.”134
In the case Chassagnou v. France, the European Court of Human Rights upheld the
country’s right to restrict a defendant’s rights if there are “necessary” and “proportionate” means
of advancing the state’s objective.135
Article 332 permits the accused to put questions forward to the witness through the
intermediary of the president of the court. This is subject to Article 309, which says that the
president maintains order in court and conducts the proceedings, he may dismiss anything that
might tend to compromise the dignity or the proceedings.

130

Code de procedure Penale (French Criminal Procedure Code), 1 January 2006, art. 274, available at
http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=34, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
131

Id. art. 317.

132

Id. art. 332.

133

Id. art. 312.

134

Id. art. 309.

135

Chassasgnou v. France, 29 E.H.R.R. 615 (2000) (ECHR), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TabX].
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ii. Germany
Germany also requires mandatory defense counsel: where the defendant is charged with a
serious offense; where the Presiding Judge finds that the assistance of Defense Counsel appears
necessary because of the difficult factual or legal situation; or where it is evident that the
defendant cannot defend himself.136 A defendant may also ask questions to the witnesses and
experts,137 but the judge may deprive this right if the defendant abuses this right or asks
inappropriate or irrelevant questions.138
iii. Belgium
In Belgium, the President of the court must verify whether the defendant has selected
counsel of his choice to represent him in front of the Cour d'Assises; if the defendant has not so
selected, the President must designate counsel for the defendant. 139
C. Common Law and Civil Law Shared Principals
The two major legal traditions may conflict on allowing self-representation and allowing
a defendant to examine a witness after his counsel has done so, but both of them do have
provisions that sometimes allow a defendant to put questions to a witness. Common law
countries allow it when the defendant is self-represented and civil law countries allow this in
addition to the counsel’s examination. All of these rights, in both procedures, are contingent on

136

German Code of Penal Procedure, 7 September 1998, available at
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StPO.htm.) Article 140, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].

137

Id. at Article 240

138

Id. at Article 241.

139

Code d'Instruction Criminelle (Belgian Criminal Code), art. 293, available at http:/
/www.juridat.be/cgi_loi/legislation, as cited in Michael P. Scharf, “Self-Representation versus Assignment of
Defence Counsel before International Criminal Tribunals," ICJ 4 1 (31), 1 March 2006, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
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the defendant’s not impeding the due process of the courts, and not abusing his chances to put
questions forward for reasons outside of justice.
VII.

ALTERNATIVES AND OPTIONS
A. Standby Counsel
What happens when a self-represented defendant becomes belligerent and refuses to

accept the measures set out by the court? Standby counsel can be imposed.140 Standby counsel
should be highly qualified and receive the same training as the prosecutors and judges and have
the assistance of international experts.141
The Seselj court found that when one is clearly trying to disrupt the court, standby
counsel may be appointed to represent the defendant when he misbehaves or cannot perform
properly.142 The appeals chamber found if ample warning was given, and the defendant still
continued to act in a way that disrupted the court, counsel could be imposed.143
The down-side of standby counsel as a remedy is that it is often imposed once the
damage has been done.144 If a court wanted to maintain a disturbance-free trial from the
beginning it would have to determine whether the cost of limiting a defendant’s rights was worth
an orderly trial. An orderly trial is important to serve justice, and to show how the justice was
served.

141

Michael P. Scharf, “Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in
War Crimes Trials.” 39 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 155, 167 (2006-2007), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 49].
142

Prosecutor v. Seselj, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Counsel, IT03-67-AR73.3, Oct. 20, 2006, at para. 21 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab5].
143
Ibid
144

Ibid.
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The United States Supreme Court found standby counsel to be constitutional in McKaskle
v. Wiggins.145 Standby counsel could step in when the defendant does not know the basic
procedures of the trial. However, the standby counsel can only participate to the extent that the
jury or court recognizes that the defendant is still in control of his defense.146 Five years later, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States expanded the roles of standby counsel, and
said that standby counsel, or public defenders, may take over the case when a defendant is
disruptive or irresponsible.147
The presence of standby counsel could also be an incentive for a defendant to behave in
the courtroom. If the defendant knows that counsel may step in, he may recognize that his
disruptive actions will not successfully impede a trial.148 Standby counsel should also be present
to replace disruptive counsel.149 If counsel also impedes the process, standby counsel that has
been following the case from the beginning and is equally qualified is just as able to represent
the defendant.
A court should know to step in when150: 1) the defendant attempts to boycott his trial;151
2) the defendant’s self-representation would prejudice the fair trial rights of co-defendants;152 3)

145

McCaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

146

Id. at 184.

147

US v. West, 877 F.2d 281, (1989) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
Michael P. Scharf, “Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in
War Crimes Trials.” 39 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 155, 167 (2006-2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 49].
148

149

Id. at 166.

150

Michael P. Scharf, “Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in
War Crimes Trials.” 39 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 155, 166 (2006-2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 49]. The following cases are cited as explanatory for the above list: 1) Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No.
ICTR-07-19-T Decision on Defense Counsel Motion to Withdraw, Para. 24 (November 2, 2000), [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 8]; 2) Prosecutor v. Norman et al., Case No. SCSL-4-14-T, Decision on the
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the defendant is being persistently disruptive or obstructionist;153 4) self-representation would
unreasonably prolong the trial.154
The threat of standby counsel was present during the trial of Saddam Hussein, in the Iraqi
High Tribunal, but the public was at first unaware of its presence, and the court had not informed
the media that the standby counsel were just as competent and as qualified as the regular counsel
of Hussein.155 Because of their ignorance, many people decried the court and trial as unfair,
further weakening the credibility of the trial.
B. Witness Protection
When a witness comes to participate in a trial it should not be to become a victim again.
This can happen if a witness is forced to relive a painful experience in front of his or her abuser,
or to face an assaultive defense team.156
“The difficulties in balancing [the rights of witnesses and defendants] stem[s] from the
fact that the Tribunal's legitimacy will suffer if either victims and witnesses or defendants
are harmed. Unfortunately, maximizing shields for witnesses requires cutting into the
confrontation right.”157

Applicant Samuel Hinga Norman for Self-Representation under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court.
Para. 14 (January 17, 2005), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9]; 3) Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Counsel. Para 21 (October
20, 2006), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab5]; 4) Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7,
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel. Para. 17
(November 1, 2004), [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab3].

155

Scharf, “Chaos in the courtroom” p.167.

156

Lakatos, 46 Hastings L.J. 909, at p9, 11. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47].

157

Id. at p 932
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The goal of protecting witnesses from the trauma of hostile cross-examination can be
pursued only so far as cross-examination can be limited.158 There are many ways to “limit”
cross-examination while still giving the defendant his right to “examine or have examined
witnesses against him.”

i. Video-Link Testimony
The Tadic and Delalic courts both implemented a way to protect witnesses while still
allowing defendants their right to testify: video-line conferencing.159 This allows the judge to
see the witness while a defense counsel cross-examines him or her.160 This would be an easy
tool for the ICC court to use, as Article 68(2) of the Rome Statute allows for video-link
testimony.161
ii.

Pre-taped Testimony

Another tactic with a video is to allow live testimony of a witness before the Tribunal to
be videotaped and later readmitted for similarly situated defendants.162 This would keep a

158

Id. p. 911.

159

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and
Witnesses, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 10 August 1995, ¶40, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6]. Prosecutor
v. Delalic, et al., Decision on the Motions by the Prosecution for Protective Measures for the Prosecution Witnesses
Pseudonymed “B” through to “M”, Case No. IT-96-21, 28 April 1997, ¶32, “III. Disposition (2)”, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab1].
160

Delalic, supra note 159, ¶57 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab1].

161

Rome Statute for the ICC, Article 68(2): As an exception to the principle of public hearings provided for in
article 67, the Chambers of the Court may, to protect victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the
proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means. In particular, such
measures shall be implemented in the case of a victim of sexual violence or a child who is a victim or a witness,
unless otherwise ordered by the Court, having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the views of the victim or
witness. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at TabX].
162

Lakatos, 46 Hastings L.J. 909, p. 936.
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witness’s testimony fresh each time, in that an emotional witness would not become more and
more distraught from continued testimony. But, if the defendant is allowed to ask new questions
to the witness that would be relayed to the witness, he could have a new chance to present a full
story and flesh out important details.163
A witness can be examined via video if the witness is younger than 16 and have suffered
an injury, or if the person cannot be examined during the hearing and his testimony is needed to
establish the truth, but only to the extent that is required to establish the truth.164 This may seem
to violate a defendant’s rights, but a witness who is emotionally drained by giving one testimony
would probably not be able to withstand giving similar testimony at another, or several, trials.
iii.

Expert Witnesses

The use of expert witnesses at trial is another option. This option almost fully protects
witnesses, in that they do not need to be identified to the defendants, they do not undergo the
grueling experience of a cross-examination, and they need not leave their surroundings and loved
ones to make a statement in a foreign country. An expert witness can pull together testimony
from several witnesses, learn their stories very well, and expedite a trial by being one witness
instead of several. The information the expert gets from this pool of witnesses can be used to
establish a pattern of crimes that could point to the responsibility of one commander.165 The
defendant could cross-examine the expert witness on how his conclusions were drawn. This
kind of testimony can conserve the resources of a trial by using one witness instead of hundreds,
163

Lakatos, 46 Hastings L.J. 909, p.935.

164

German Code of Penal Procedure, German Code of Penal Procedure, (available at
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StPO.htm.) art. 58a, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
165

Lakatos, 46 Hastings L.J. 909 at p. 936, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
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and it reduces the defendant’s chance to deduce the authenticity of each witness and ask
questions pertaining to each witness’s specific situation.
iv.

Screens

A screen could be used to protect the identity of a witness, and this would solve the
problem of not being able to ask specific questions pertaining to a witness’s situation, but it
would be hard for a court to judge the demeanor of the witness. Perhaps if a situation could be
adjusted to allow a judge to see the witness while the defense could not, this would be more
acceptable to a court.
v.

The Problem of Witness Anonymity

Hiding the identity of a witness behind a screen brings in the problem of witness
anonymity, however. A witness can be held anonymous only under certain situations. A five
prong test was determined by the Trial Court in the ICTY.166 The five-prongs to be met are: (1)
the existence of a real fear for the safety of the witness; (2) the testimony of the witness must be
sufficiently relevant and important to the case; (3) there must be no prima facie evidence of the
witness's unworthiness in any way; (4) the non-existence of a witness protection program; (5) the
unavailability of less restrictive protective measures.167
If the criteria in the 5-prong test are not met, and it is apparent that a witness must be in
the courtroom to give live testimony in front of the defendant and his counsel, the tribunal could
166

Prosector v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and
Witnesses ¶¶62-66, 10 August 1995, available at http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
167

This information was put together by Mercedeh Momeni in “Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused
Against the Need to Protect Victims and Witnesses” in the Howard Law Journal. P. 3, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
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implement several new measures. First, it could allow judges to ask for lists of proposed
questions prior to witness testimony. This way the judges would have an opportunity to
preemptively screen out inappropriate questions.168 Next, counsel could be allowed to ask new
questions from new information that came up during the examination. If an attorney asked
improper questions during the improvisation of new questions, the Tribunal could allow
sanctions against attorneys who persist in the inappropriate questions.169
The court in the ICTY could have seen that granting a defendant the right to crossexamine means that the defense counsel have the right to cross-examine. Therefore, the phrase
‘or have examined,’ which is in Article 21, means that there is a right of examination to be
fulfilled by someone other than the accused, or the accused’s counsel.170 If so, a defendant need
not be there during the cross-examination at all.

VIII.

IMPORTANCE OF COUNSEL IN WAR CRIMES TRIALS, AND
DISALLOWING DEFENDANTS PERSONALLY EXAMINING WITNESSES
A. Disruptive Behavior is Likely from Defendants who are Self-Represented, or
Allowed to Cross-Examine
It is particularly important for defendants to not only be given a fair trial, but also an

orderly trial. Professor Michael Scharf, in his article “Chaos in the courtroom” outlined three
reasons to control defendants in a courtroom. “[D]isruptive conduct renders it more difficult for
the defendant and any co-defendants to obtain a fair trial. Second, it hampers the court’s ability

168

Lakatos, 46 Hastings L.J. 909, pp. 936-937. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47].

169

Ibid.

170

Lakatos, “Balancing Witnesses’ Needs,” 46 Hastings L.J. 909, p. 924. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 47].
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to facilitate the testimony of victims and other witnesses. Third, it undermines the public’s
confidence in and respect for the legal process.”171
First, a defendant of a war crime trial is likely to act in a disruptive manner to challenge
the legitimacy of the court.172 Defendants such as Milosevic and Hussein did this to
communicate to the people watching them that they might be innocent victims. The people
watching the Milosevic and Hussein trials at home saw the disorder and chaos in the trials and
sympathized with them. The Serb population elected Milosevic to the Serb parliament in a
nationwide election, during his trial.173 Opinion polls showed that a majority of Serbs felt he was
not getting a fair trial, and that he was not actually guilty of any war crimes.174
Ordinarily, when a party insults the judge, harasses witnesses, or raises absurd objections
at crucial times, he would be removed from the courtroom. This is more difficult to do when a
defendant is representing himself, however. That is why it is important for a court in a war
crimes prosecution trial to impose counsel.175
i. War Crimes Trials are too Complex for a Defendant to Represent
Himself
Next, war crimes trials are extremely complex and it is unlikely that a defendant will be
able to represent himself against charges of crimes against humanity, in a court that is sui
generis. Crimes against humanity are a crime under international humanitarian law, which is

171

Scharf, “Chaos in the Courtroom,” 39 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 155, 157, [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 49].

172

Scharf, “Self-Representation,” ICJ 4 1 (31), 38. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
53].
173
Michael P. Scharf & Christopher M. Rassi, “Do Former Leaders Have an International Right to SelfRepresentation in War Crimes Trials?” 20 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3, 6 (2005), [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 50].
174

Ibid.

175

Scharf, “Self-Representation,” ICJ 4 1 (31), at p.38, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab53].
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very complicated and requires special law training.176 Most war crimes tribunals are sui generis,
and they often implement statutes and precedents from both common law and civil law practices.
A lawyer must be familiar in both forms of law to adequately represent a defendant.177 Also, the
nature of the crimes, the geographical location of most of the crimes, and access to witnesses is
extremely challenging and requires time and resources that defendants in a trial have no access
to.178
ii. War Crimes Trials are Important to the Defendants’ Home
Countries
War crimes trials are important to the nations watching them for justice. These trials
must be fair and orderly to impress the world that they are competent trials. “War crimes trials,
whether before international tribunals or domestic courts, seek to establish a credible historic
record of abuses and elevate the rule of law over the force of might, thereby facilitating the
restoration of peace and the transition to democracy.”179 This is a lofty goal for war crimes
trials, but he believed that the actions of the court would determine the future of victims of war
criminals.
iii. War Crimes Trials are Important for Victims
If a major reason to have a war crime trial is to help a nation forgive and help victims
reconcile, it is hard to do so if people believe that the person getting a trial is not guilty or not
receiving a fair trial.
176

Ibid.

177

Ibid.

178

Ibid

179

Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom, 39 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 155, 157, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
TabX], summarizing Robert Jackson’s opening argument, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 2, Second Day, 21
November 1945, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/11-21-45.htm, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 49].
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IX.

CONCLUSION
Due to the complex nature of war crimes trials and the likelihood that defendants will try

to disrupt the proceedings, appointment of counsel from the beginning is the best way to achieve
the objectives of a war crimes trial. Even if self-representation is granted, a court could have
standby counsel waiting in the wings for when a defendant becomes disruptive, although some
damage will have been done by that point. A war crimes trial exists to bring justice to people
groups and countries that have been violated and torn apart, not to give perpetrators a chance at
vindication. “Self-representation has thus enabled Milosevic to cloud the historic record and to
transform himself into a martyr, rather than a discredited war criminal.”180 The Milosevic
outcome is something the ICC must avoid at all costs, and taking steps to restrict a defendant’s
right to be disruptive is imperative in that process.

180

Scharf, “Self-Representation," ICJ 4 1 (31), 33, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
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APPENDIX I: STATUTES OF HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS AND COURTS
REGARDING CROSS-EXAMINATION AND SELF-REPRESENTATION
Name of Treaty or
Covenant
International Court
of Justice (ICJ)
(1945)181

Right to selfrepresentation?
Article 42(1),(2):
“they may have the
assistance of counsel
or advocates before
the Court.”

Universal
Declaration of
Human Rights
(1948)182

NO

European
Convention for the
Protection of Human
Rights (ECHR)
(1950)183
International
Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights
(ICCPR) (1966)184

Article 6(3)(c): “to
defend himself in
person or through
legal assistance of his
own choosing”
Article 14(2)(d): “to
defend himself in
person or through
legal assistance of his
own choosing”
Article 8(2)(d): “to

American

Right to crossexamine?
Article 51: “any
relevant questions are
to be put to the
witnesses and experts
under the conditions
laid down by the court
in the rules of
procedure referenced
in Article 30.
NO

Other relevant
statutes?
Article 30: “The
Court shall frame
rules for carrying out
its functions.”

Article 11(1): “to
have a public trial at
which he has had all
the guarantees
necessary for his
defense.”

Article 6(3)(d): “to
examine or have
examined witnesses
against him”
Article 14(2)(e): “to
examine, or have
examined, the
witnesses against
him”
Article 8(2)(f): “to

181

Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, available at http://www.icjcij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab32].
182

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html, [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
183

Statute of the European Court of Human Rights, 1950, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf,
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
184

Statute of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
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Convention on
Human Rights
(ACHR) (1969)185

Banjul Charter:
African Charter on
Human and Peoples’
Rights (1981)186
Rome Statute of the
International
Criminal Court
(1998)187

defend himself
personally or to be
assisted by legal
counsel of his own
choosing, and to
communicate freely
and privately with his
counsel”
Article 7(1)(c): “to
defense, including the
right to be defended
by counsel of his
choice”
Article 67(1)(d): “to
conduct the defense in
person or through
legal assistance of the
accused’s choosing”

examine witnesses
present in the court”

NO

Article 67(1)(e): “to
examine, or have
examined, the
witnesses against him
or her”

185

Statute of the American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm, [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 35].

186

Statute of the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
187

Statute of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 [hereinafter Rome Statute],
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab30].
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APPENDIX II: STATUTES OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS REGARDING CROSSEXAMINATION AND SELF-REPRESENTATION
Name of Court

Right to crossexamine?

Right to selfrepresentation?

Other related
statutes?

Charter of the
International
Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg (IMT)
(1945)188

Articles 16(e): “A
defendant shall have
the right through
himself or through his
counsel to…crossexamine any witness
called by the
Prosecution…”

Article 16(d): “A
defendant shall have
the right to conduct
his own defense
before the Tribunal or
to have the assistance
of counsel.”

Article 18(b): “take
strict measures to
prevent any action
which will cause
unreasonable delay
and rule out irrelevant
issues and statements
of any kind
whatsoever…”

Charter of the
International
Military Tribunal
for the Far East
(IMTFE) (1946)189

Article 9(d): “Each
accused shall have the
right, through himself
or through his counsel
(but not through
both), to conduct his
defense, including the
right to examine any
witness, subject to
such reasonable
restrictions as the
Tribunal may
determine.

Article 9(c): “Each
accused shall have the
right to be represented
by counsel of his own
selection, subject to
the disapproval of
such counsel at any
time by the
Tribunal…In the
absence of such a
request [to appoint
counsel when the
accused does not have
counsel] the Tribunal
may appoint counsel
for an accused if, in
its judgment, such
appointment is
necessary to provide a
fair trial.”

Article 12(b): “Take
strict measures to
prevent any action
which would cause
any unreasonable
delay and rule out
irrelevant issues and
statements of any kind
whatsoever…”

International
Criminal Tribunal

Articles 21(4)(e): “to
examine, or have

Article 21(4)(d): “to
defend himself in

188

Statute of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1945 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter],
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm#art16, [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 37].
189

Statute of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 1946 [hereinafter Far East Charter],
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab38].
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for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)
(1993)190

examined, the
witnesses against
him”

person or through
legal assistance of his
own choosing… and
to have legal
assistance assigned to
him, in any case
where the interest of
justice so require.”

International
Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR)
(1994)191

Article 20(4)(e): “To
examine, or have
examined, the
witnesses against him
or her”

Article 20(4)(d): “to
defend himself in
person or through
legal assistance of his
or her own
choosing…and to
have legal assistance
assigned to him or
her, in any case where
the interest of justice
so require.”

Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL)
(2000)192

Article 17(4)(e): “to
examine, or have
examined, the
witnesses against him
or her”

Article 17(4)(d): “to
defend himself or
herself in person or
through legal
assistance of his or
her own choosing...
and to have legal
assistance assigned to
him or her, in any
case where the
interests of justice so
require…”

Iraqi High Tribunal

Rule 57: “questioning

Article 19(4)(D): “to

Article 19(4)(B): “to

190

Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 28 February 2006 [hereinafter
ICTY Statute], available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 39].
191

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 November 1994 [hereinafter ICTR Statute],
available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
40].
192

Statute of the Special Court for the Sierra Leone, 14 August 2000 [hereinafter SCSL Statute], available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
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(IHT) (2005)

and cross examination
of the witness shall be
allowed for each case
by the opponents to
refute his
statements.”193

use a lawyer of his
own choosing…”194

Extraordinary
Chambers for the
Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC) (2003)196

Articles 13(1): “to
examine or have
examined the
witnesses against him
or her”

Articles 13(1): “to
engage a counsel of
his or her choice”

have non-Iraqi legal
representation, so
long as the principal
lawyer of such
accused is Iraqi.”195

193

Al-Waqa’I Al-Iraqiya, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 18 October 2005,
available at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_rules_procedure_evidence.pdf, [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
194

Al-Waqa’I Al-Iraqiya, Iraqi High Criminal Court Law, 18 October 2005, available at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf, [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 27].
195
Id.
196

Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the prosecution
under Cambodian law of crimes committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea, 2003 [hereinafter ECCC
Statute], available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/documents/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf,
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
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